New Directions in Asia Pacific Studies: A Summary

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The two days of meetings at APU, on “Creating an Asia Pacific Style of Management Education,” and “Reshaping Asia Pacific Studies: New Perspectives and Tasks,” produced both a number of personal statements by participants on their own practices and philosophies, and extensive discussions. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief summary of the main points which arose both during the presentations and the discussions and to relate them to the emerging scholarly literature on the Asia Pacific region as a whole. The most distinctive features of the sociology of the Asia Pacific are the rapid economic growth of many of the countries within it, particularly in East Asia, the innovations in management and production that have allowed this to happen, and the relations between capitalist development and the state. But first, there are the basic questions of the definition and boundaries of the Asia Pacific region, and it is to this that I turn first.

Pacific Asia or the Asia Pacific?

Even though APU itself may be new, studies of the Asia Pacific region, however defined, clearly go back a bit further. In 1967, the then foreign minister of Japan, Miki Takeo, gave a speech in which he described the Asia Pacific region as a “new concept” (Miki 1967), and the number of references to it in the published literature have proliferated ever since. As a rough indication of this, the number of books being published with both “Asia” and “Pacific” in the title (and which are available in the Oxford University library system) has more or less doubled in each five year period since then: from 11 in 1971-75, and 22 in 1976-80, to 50 in 1981-85, 111 in 1986-90, 238 in 1991-1995, and 291 in 1996-2000. Along with the literature has grown the number of academic institutions specializing in this new region, however defined. Even though APU is the first case of an entire university being dedicated to the study of the region, a cursory search on Yahoo produced details of Asia Pacific programs and/or study centers at institutions as widely spread as Duke, Harvard, Hawaii, Iowa,

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1 Much of the research for this paper was carried out thanks to a grant from the Research Center for Asia Pacific Studies at APU to collect documentation on the Asia Pacific Region. I am most grateful to the RCAPS steering committee for the funds, to Professor Fukui Hayao and the late Professor Hotta Makitaro who suggested the idea, and to Professor Jido Yuji who suggested that a summary of some of the main themes arising from the symposia might be useful.

2 Figures are taken from searches on the COPAC catalogue of major British university research libraries, available on http://copac.ac.uk.

Further inspection of the literature however reveals a contradiction that also came out of the APU meetings: different authors define the region in rather different ways. As Kee Poo-Kong notes in his paper, these definitions are always colored by geographical or national standpoints. The “Pacific Asia” of Drakakis-Smith, Lo and Yeung, and Preston refers mainly to East and Southeast Asia, though Preston does include a chapter on relations with the U.S. as well (1998: 154-68). Borthwick’s study of the “Pacific Century” (1992) covers a similar area. Dobb-Higginson’s “Asia Pacific” is also centered mainly on East and Southeast Asia, with the addition of India, Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. (Bangladesh is, however, omitted.) The widest definition is that of the Open University volumes, where the “Asia Pacific” takes in the whole of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the western countries of North, Central and South America, and the Pacific islands. At the APU symposia, Governor Hiramatsu of Oita Prefecture produced an inverted map of East and Southeast Asia showing the centrality of Kyushu, while Professor Mostow of UBC argued that Vancouver could also lay claim to being central to the region, thanks to its large Asian population. Given this diversity of opinions, Professor Sakamoto has prudently urged flexibility in our approach to both the study of the region and its boundaries (Sakamoto 1998: 9).

Personal and institutional agendas apart, different definitions of the region pose quite different sets of intellectual questions, and it is worth considering these in greater detail. To the Ancient Greeks, Europe and Asia were divided by the entrance to the Black Sea, and Asia consisted basically of the areas belonging to the Persian empire to the east. As the Romans took over the entire Mediterranean basin this division ceased to make much sense, but it has remained entrenched in common usage, even though anthropologists such as Jack Goody have argued that Eurasia should be treated as a single cultural area for certain purposes, e.g. in contrast to land tenure and kinship systems in Africa (Goody 1990). However, the Asian land mass is so vast that it has usually been subdivided into discrete regions for most practical purposes: the “Middle East” (often including at least Egypt and sometimes the other Islamic areas of North Africa), “South Asia” (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), and “East” and “Southeast” Asia (the latter term becoming popular only since the Second World War).
From time to time, forms of religious and political unity were imposed on these rather disparate regions. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism provided a degree of religious cohesion over large areas of eastern Asia from ancient times, as did the Chinese and Mongol empires. Islam spread from the west early rather later, reaching Southeast Asia in the 15th century. One of the ironies of history is that if China had not closed its doors during the Ming dynasty, the Chinese might well have sailed round Africa and “discovered” Europe before the Europeans could come the other way (Kennedy 1989: 7-8). European incursions into the Pacific date from a century later, beginning with the Portuguese and Spanish. They were followed in turn by the French, the British, and the Dutch, the Russians (in the north Pacific), and later still, the Americans. From the 16th century, much of the Pacific basin was controlled by the Spanish, established in the Philippines on one side and from California to Chile on the other, though Spain lost control of its American colonies in the 1820s and the Philippines in 1899. In their wake the British and Dutch moved in to take over what are now Malaysia and Indonesia, while the Americans eventually took over much of Mexico. The Japanese developed their own colonial agenda after the Meiji restoration, thus effectively copying what the Europeans were already doing (Befu 2000: 21).

During the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, therefore, there was a series of major events which had the result of drawing the two sides of the Pacific, as well as Europe and Asia, closer together. These included the Opium Wars of the 1840s, the American takeover of the Philippines, the Japanese wars against Russia and China and their annexation of Taiwan and Korea, and most cataclysmic of all, the Pacific War itself. Since the French departure from Indochina and the independence of Malaysia, the British and French have played a less active role in the region, but the Americans continued to play a major part in wars and power politics, both in Asia and Latin America. Meanwhile, sheltered by the American security umbrella, the Japanese concentrated on rebuilding and developing their own economy. By the 1980s the Japanese economy was so strong that Japan began to be seen as America’s major competitor, since its former rival, the Soviet Union, was collapsing with the end of the Cold War. More recently, and especially under the Bush administration, the role of potential adversary seems to be increasingly assigned to China. In 1997-98, the Asian economic crisis finally revealed the full extent of globalization, and that what happened on the stock exchanges and currency markets of East Asia now had profound implications for the rest of the globe.

It is against the background of the breakdown of the colonial and Cold War systems and the increasing tri-polarization of the world into three main trading blocks

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3 Frank (1998) takes this argument even further and argues that Asia always was the center of the world economy, and that European dominance really only lasted from about 1800 until the resurgence of the Asian economies in the late 20th century.


that recent discussions of the Asia Pacific region in its various guises have taken place. In his study of the world economic system in the “information age” Castells argues that the advanced economies are moving from the production and distribution of goods to the production and dissemination of information (Castells 1996). This process has extensive ramifications: the nature of work changes, traditional skills lose their value in the market place, and the gender division of labor is altered. With the collapse of communism, the changing international division of labor, and the collapse of the traditional “patriarchal” family in the advanced industrial societies, new identities become increasingly significant, including gender, ethnicity and religion (Castells 1997). Religious fundamentalism takes on a new appeal because of the instant solutions it appears to offer to new social problems. And even though the world economy is becoming refocused around the three growth poles of Europe, North America, and East Asia, there are large areas left outside, denied access to the new technology and the wealth it generates. These “fourth world” enclaves according to Castells not only include much of Africa, Central and South America, and the former Soviet Union, but also the urban ghettos and slums of even the richest countries (Castells 1999). The most obvious examples of these disparities are to be found in the United States, but even Tokyo is not without its nomadic laborers and cardboard cities of the homeless (Gill 2001). Finally, the nation-state itself has been weakened by the global flows of capital and information. These factors have put pressure on nations within the same region to collaborate with each other and exchange a part of their sovereignty for medium-term economic, social, and political stability as part of a group. Here the lead has been taken by the EU, but groupings in the Americas and perhaps even East Asia are starting to develop along similar lines (Castells 1999; cf. Kondo 2000).

Within this global context, two kinds of geographical focus seem to be developing in the literature on the Pacific Basin: first what we might term a “Pacific Asia” bloc, consisting mainly of East and South East Asia, and second a more inclusive “Asia Pacific” region covering the Pacific Rim (as in the Open University texts). Usage of course is not consistent, and a number of recent books on the “Asia Pacific” only cover East Asia, sometimes with the addition of Australasia. The point to make here is that these different focuses lead to quite different, if ultimately complementary, sets of political, economic, and sociological questions, and these will be explored in the next section.

Issues in the Study of Pacific Asia

A number of recent studies have concentrated on the “Pacific Asia” region, including the countries of East and/or Southeast Asia. This is not surprising, given the historical and cultural links between the countries of this region, and the developing sense of economic and cultural identity which has accompanied the rising economic prosperity. Starting with the reconstruction of Japan, successive groups of economies in the region experienced double digit economic growth over a period of more than a decade: the four dragon economies of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, followed more recently by Thailand, Malaysia, and the eastern coastal areas of
China.\textsuperscript{6} As a result the nature of the social and economic problems discussed in the literature has changed dramatically over the years.

The Roots of Economic Development

Discussions of development have moved away from how to achieve it, which provided the focus for Myrdal’s survey a generation ago (Myrdal 1968), to how it has been achieved. Most analyses focus either on the contribution of Asian cultural traditions, such as Confucianism, or on the distinctive role of the state in fostering economic growth. It is generally recognized that variations on what Chalmers Johnson calls the “developmental state”\textsuperscript{7} have been crucial in economic growth within the region, though there are considerable variations in the exact roles played by the state, government corporations, private capital, and systems of management and labor relations in fostering or guiding this growth.\textsuperscript{7} In any case, the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s has meant that discussions of economic miracles have been put on the back burner for the time being.

Urbanization

A second category of issues concerns the nature of the urbanization process that has accompanied this economic growth and the nature of urban life. In the immediate postwar period, descriptions of Singapore, Hong Kong, and even cities in Japan portrayed them as classic “third world” cities, focusing on the problems of disease and poverty, the homeless, squatter settlements, rural-urban migration and the informal sector of the economy.\textsuperscript{8} Even though these strands of research still continue in Latin America and the poorer parts of Asia, including Indonesia and the Philippines, another literature has developed in relation to the more affluent countries like Singapore and Japan (Eades in press). In this, the main issues are those of consumption, high rise living, the newly affluent, department stores, tourism, and leisure. Analysis of these and similar issues can now also be found in the literatures


\textsuperscript{7} The debate about the developmental state, beginning with Johnson (1982), has also generated a large literature. Other important contributions include Wade (1990), Okimoto (1989) Calder (1993), Aoki et al. (eds) (1995), and Woo-Cumings (ed.) (1999).

\textsuperscript{8} For classic statements on squatter settlements, see Castells (1983: part 4) and Bronley (1985). For national case studies of poverty, see Remenyi and Quinones (eds) (2000). For good contemporary studies of third world urban problems, see Badshah (1996) and Pernia (1994). For a recent theoretical discussion of alternative urban scenarios for the future, see Hall and Pfeiffer (2000).
on Malaysia, Thailand, and even the more affluent parts of China.9 Along with this rising tide of affluence has gone an increasing concern with the urban environment, reflected in the rise of organized pressure groups and social movements. Once more Japan took the lead, with the mobilizations around the issues of pollution-related disease and airport construction in the 1970s: concerns now extend to the construction of dams, leisure resorts, golf courses, and the availability of organic foods.10 More recently, citizens environmental activism has also been noted in Korea and Taiwan, made easier by the process of political reforms which have taken place there since the 1980s.11

The Developmental State

The developmental state is by nature autocratic, so that discussions of economic growth are almost inevitably linked to those of democratization. In his analysis of economic development in China, Overholt (1993) argued that rapid economic growth sustained over a long period tends to produce a large middle class demanding an increasing share in control of the polity. He linked this with the processes of democratization in Korea and Taiwan, and suggested that similar processes were underway in China.12 On the other hand the poorer countries of the region are still experiencing a good deal of political instability, the most spectacular recent examples being the Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippines saw one of the first and most successful demonstrations of “people power” in 1986 with the ousting of President Marcos. More recently there have been the mainly middle-class demonstrations and the ousting of President Estrada amidst allegations of corruption, followed by a largely working-class backlash by his supporters. Similarly in Indonesia, allegations of corruption and moves to impeach President Wahid by the legislature have led to demonstrations by his supporters on the street.13 In these countries there appears a real danger that authoritarian government will not be replaced by democracy but by mob rule, perhaps opening the way for a return of the military, as has often been the case in Latin America.

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11 The Taiwanese and Korean cases are summarised in Kim et al. (1999) on Korea, and Williams (1994), and Chen (1994) on Taiwan.

12 For a recent collection of essays exploring these issues throughout the region, see Ravitch (2000).

13 On Indonesian Islam and the background to the rise of Wahid, see Hefner (2000).
Issues in the Study of the Asia Pacific

Widening the boundaries of the region to include the eastern Pacific and the islands has the result of changing the nature of the main issues and questions in Asia Pacific studies. It is in relation to this wider definition that predictions that the 21st century will be the "Pacific Century" have their most obvious relevance (pace Borthwick 1992), and where some of the main rivalries in international relations are most likely to be played out, particularly between the U.S. and China as noted above. This raises some interesting questions about the future position of the other major players in the region in relation to this competition, such as Russia, Japan, or even India. It would be ironic if a more hawkish U.S. foreign policy were to push Russia and China back into each others' arms and a return of the socialist fraternity of the early 1950s.

Colonialism and Peasantries

Some of the most interesting comparative issues involving the Pacific Basin as a whole are historical. Both sides of the Pacific were subjected to European colonialism from the 16th century onwards. East Asian colonies being primarily colonies of exploitation and those of the New World and Australasia being primarily colonies of settlement. This raises some fascinating comparative questions about the nature of colonialism, its effects on the indigenous peoples, the process of decolonization, and the implications of all of these for the societies of the Pacific Basin today. As one example, there are some obvious similarities in the position of aboriginal minorities right round the region, from the native Americans, native Canadians and Latin American Indians, to the aboriginal cultures of Siberia, Taiwan, and Australia, the Ainu and Okinawans in Japan, and the various non-Han Chinese minorities in China. As another example there are the questions of land tenure, relations between the peasantry and landowners, and the resulting cycle of peasant discontent and rebellion. Two pioneering works by Eric Wolf, on peasant wars (1971) and the impact of colonialism on the "people without history" (1982) defined these as major fields for comparative research, but the continued unrest and warfare in the countryside in some countries, together with the resurgence of minority rights groups throughout the region able to communicate with each other through the internet, suggest that the time is ripe for further comparative research.

Migrant Diaspora Communities and Ethnicity

Another effect of colonialism was the scattering all over the region of migrant communities of workers, traders, and colonial administrators, mainly from India and China. In some territories, such as Singapore or Fiji, they came to constitute a very large percentage of the population, with political and economic repercussions up to the present day. In others they constituted smaller but often extremely affluent

“middleman minorities,” as in Malaysia or Indonesia, making them vulnerable to attack during times of political crisis during the post-independence period. More recently, the growing divide between the rich and poor countries of the region, coupled with a low birth rate and a growing labor shortage in the more affluent ones, has led to a continuing flow of migrant labor from the poorer to richer regions. In Japan the “foreign worker problem” became the subject of intensive research during the heady days of the “bubble economy” when labor in the construction and service industries was in particularly short supply (Komai 1995), intensifying the pressures on Japan’s own indigenous casual work force (Gill 2001). Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand have experienced similar influxes of migrants from their poorer neighbors, while within China there has been a massive flow of labor from the countryside, particularly in the west of the country, to the richer cities of the eastern coast such as Shanghai (Bakken 1998). One of the more interesting features of the Asian economic crisis in 1997-98 was the way in which the more affluent countries like Singapore slammed the door on these migrants, rounding up and deporting large numbers of them.\(^{15}\)

The terms “ethnic groups” and “ethnic relations” cover an enormous range of social phenomena in the region as a whole, and it may be worth distinguishing between the following ideal types.

(a) *Classic instances of colonies of settlement*, where the settlers now form the bulk of the population, and the aboriginal inhabitants are reduced to a small minority. This is basically the situation in the major settler colonies of Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.\(^{16}\) The big issues at the moment between national governments and aboriginal groups are legal, the nature and observance of the original treaties which were signed, aboriginal control over natural resources such as mineral, forestry and fishing rights, equal access to education, employment and welfare, and protection of “traditional” cultures and language, though as will be seen in a moment, the nature of culture itself is problematic.

(b) *Classic instances of colonies of exploitation*. These are cases in which small European populations came to dominate large indigenous populations, as was the case throughout much of East and Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, Malaya and the former colonies which later formed Malaysia, and Indochina. Similar expatriate enclaves could be found in the various treaty ports in China and Japan. In the case of Asia itself, the Japanese colonization of Korea and Manchuria was rather similar (Duus 1995, Young 1998, Duus, Myers and Peattie 1996), and Japanese were also spread all over the Pacific (Myers and Peattie 1984, Befu 2000). Most of the expatriate communities disappeared at the end of the Pacific War or during the process of decolonization.

\(^{15}\) On the historical background to migration in the region, see Cohen (ed.) (1995: chapters 3, 11). I have also discussed the impact of the Asian crisis on migration in Eades (1998).

\(^{16}\) For the standard literatures on these groups, see Kepers (1994: 126-33), Ingles (1990: 60-69), Patterson and Patterson (1998: 60-69), and the many references throughout Burchell (2000). Canada is also well covered in Fleras and Eliot (1996).
(c) *Colonial labor and trading diasporas.* During the colonial period the colonial officials moved large amounts of labor between colonies, resulting most prominently in the development of large Indian and Chinese populations throughout the region. In many cases these populations were able to accumulate capital sufficiently to move into trade and service industries such as catering, transforming them into relatively affluent “middleman minorities.” The best examples in the region are the Overseas Chinese communities in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere.\(^\text{17}\) More recently, as a result of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, there has been a large influx of Koreans, Vietnamese and others into the United States.\(^\text{18}\) Many of these have also moved into retailing and similar businesses. Middleman minorities throughout the world (Bonacich 1973) are also likely to be targets of attacks during periods of economic and political instability, such as the attacks on Korean shopkeepers during riots in Los Angeles, or the attacks on merchants of Chinese descent in Indonesia at the time of the fall of the Suharto regime (Vatikiotis 1998: 227). In other cases in Southeast Asia the Chinese have assimilated to a considerable extent, as in Thailand and the Philippines (e.g. Hodder 1996). A final example, also a hangover from the colonial period, is the presence of large numbers of people of Korean descent in Japan. Some retain a strong sense of Korean identity, either North or South, but others have lost their Korean language over the generations and gradually assimilated further and further into the Japanese population (cf. Fukuoka 2000, Ryang 1997).

(d) *Race relations and mixed communities.* In other countries there has also been considerable intermarriage between peoples of European and non-European descent, leading to the growth of a mixed community, which in some Latin American countries actually forms the majority of the population. What typically happens in these kinds of inter-racial situations is that a hierarchy develops, with the people of European descent at the top, the non-Europeans at the bottom, and the people of mixed descent somewhere in between. The distribution of wealth, power and legal rights is also based on this hierarchy, and the big issue in civil rights movements, from Peru to Canada, is how to overcome inequalities, poverty and discrimination.

(e) *Relations between immigrant minorities.* In settler societies such as Canada, Australia and the United States, yet another issue which arises is that of relations between the various immigrant ethnic groups. Many of these groups may actually look the same and are able to mix and intermarry fairly freely, such as the European groups in the United States, but a complicating factor is where physical differences in appearance between groups make

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\(^{17}\) For recent case studies, see Chan (ed.) (2000), Gambe (1999).

discrimination easy, as with the Americans of African or Asian descent. More recently there has been the issue of the position of Asian migrants in Australian politics. In these instances, the dynamics of ethnic relations begin to resemble (d) above.

(f) Multicultural populations within the same population due to colonial boundaries. Many international boundaries during the colonial period were decided by the colonizing powers, and took now account of local political and cultural realities. These boundaries showed a remarkable resilience at the time of independence, and many of them survive till today. The result is that many countries in the region have many minority groups and languages, their numbers running into hundreds in the case of Indonesia. Other prominent examples are the Philippines and Burma, and in all of these there are local secession movements based on differences in language, culture and religion. The problems have been complicated by the historic distribution of power, wealth, and in the case of Aceh in Indonesia, oil and other mineral resources. The case of China is slightly different, in that the non-Han Chinese ethnic minorities form a relatively small proportion of the population, and because the Chinese adopted the Soviet model of administration for minority groups. The situation has become increasingly complex because of internal migration within the country and the on-going Han Chinese colonization of sparsely populated minority areas. The more than fifty recognized minorities range from the fairly large (the Tibetans, Uyghur and Muslim Hui), to the very small (such as the Russians). Some of them suffered badly during the Cultural Revolution, such as the Tibetans and the Mongols, and Tibetan autonomy is a major ongoing issue both within China and internationally. In Mongolia, however, a large proportion of the population are now wholly or partly of Han Chinese descent (Jankowiak 1993: chapter 3). Some people who formerly saw themselves as Chinese now prefer to see themselves as members of one or other of the minorities, because of the advantages it gives them in relation to education, jobs, and family planning policy.

This final case touches on a further important aspect of ethnicity and cultural differences. While many people still see cultures as discrete and bounded entities, anthropologists tend to see them as essentially fluid, and subject to constant redefinition by the actors themselves. While ethnic categories may remain fixed, the

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19 On Asians in Australia, see Inglis et al. (1993).
20 Two recent studies of Burma are those by Tucker (2000), and Smith (1999). For other case studies from Burma and neighboring countries, see also McCaskill and Kempe (eds) (1997). On problems of nationalism and national unity in the region in general, see also the papers in Leifer (2000) and Pfaff-Czarnecka et al. (1999).
21 On the Chinese approach to minorities, see Guldin (1994). On specific minorities, see the studies of the Hui by Gladney (1991), and Dillon (1999), the Miao by Schein (2000), minorities in Yunnan (Hansen 1999), the Uyghur of Xinjiang (Rudelson 1997), and the urban inhabitants of Inner Mongolia (Jankowiak 1993).
22 The classic case is that of the Bai in the Dali Basin of Yunnan. See Yokoyama (1995).
definition of who belongs and the way in which they express their identity is constantly changing. Anthropologists and historians now talk about “traveling cultures” (Clifford 1997: 17-46) and the “creolization of cultures” in the “global eumene” (Hannerz 1992: chapter 7) rather than cultures and cultural areas per se. Thus some Koreans in Japan continue to see themselves as Koreans, even though they can no longer speak Korean, and have never been to Korea (Ryang 1997).

Cultural Hegemony and Consumption

One of the reasons for the fluidity of culture is that people are communicating and moving around so rapidly. At the same time, the restructuring of industry, the offshoring of production, the spread of the multinationals on a global scale has led to an international homogenization of culture which has been sarcastically labeled by Ritzer as “McDonaldization” (Ritzer 1993). Whatever one may think of the qualities of hamburgers or other kinds of global food as such, the fact is that the goods on offer in many regions of the world are indeed increasingly similar. It is not just American influence which is hegemonic, but also that of Europe and Japan, as evidenced in perfumes, designer fashions and electronic gadgets, including the ubiquitous karaoke machines (Mitsui and Hosokawa 1998).

The social significance of consumption goes considerably beyond meeting people’s daily needs. First, consumption itself is orchestrated by the marketing industry and the media, as well as by the businessmen who provide goods which they hope the public will come to desire. The title of Thomas Havens’ book on one of Japan’s leading business families, Architects of Affluence, sums this up well (Havens 1994). Second, consumption itself creates social identities and new divisions within society that cross-cut those of gender and class. Clammer (1997) has noted for Japan how consumption of the same items creates new groups of people with common interests. In some cases, as with the sale of organic foods, consumption forms the basis of networks with increasing political influence.

Third, new types of consumption have considerable impact on the economy and the environment. Tabb and McCormack have both noted how in the 1970s, the Japanese government stopped giving priority to reshaping the Japanese archipelago, in the wake of the pollution scandals that erupted, and turned instead to the provision of leisure facilities (Tabb 1995, McCormack 1996: chapter 2). However, coastal holiday resorts transform the shoreline with concrete, while golf courses replace woodlands and pollute water courses with the fertilizers and insecticides which the maintenance of the fairways and greens requires. And as with production, the effects spread overseas as the construction of golf courses and resorts spreads to the developing countries and transforms the environment there as well (e.g. Ben-Ari 2000, Hirsch and Warren eds 1998).

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23 On changing food habits in the region, see the papers in Watson (1997) and Jing (2000).
24 For recent studies of the Japanese advertising industry, see Moeran (1996), and McCreevy (2000).
The Rise of the Tourist Industry

With the increasing affluence of the major industrial countries, the increase in leisure time and the reduction in the cost of travel, tourism seems set to become the largest of all industries in the 21st century, and it is crucial to the economies of many of the countries of the Asia Pacific region (Yamashita, Kadir and Eades eds. 1997). A wide range of tourist attractions are marketed, from the sun and sea of the tropical beach resorts to various forms of ecotourism, heritage tourism in the major historical cultural centers, and local handicrafts (Cohen 2000). However, the tourist industry is also becoming globalized and internationalized, particularly the hotel industry which has long been dominated by a small number of international chains. Apart from a few local touches in the décor and the local souvenirs on offer in the hotel shop, there are few major differences between their outlets anywhere in the world. Even though many bemoan the impact of tourism on what they see as the pristine “traditional” culture, Yamashita has made the point that culture is in any case constantly being reinvented and recreated, and that many of the “traditional” cultural events which tourists watch turn out to have originally been created for the tourist market. A good case in point is that of traditional dances in Bali, many of which were developed by Walter Spies, a German artist who set up a studio on the island during the 1920s (Yamashita 1999). Now they are being enjoyed and consumed by Balinese, other Indonesians and tourists alike as representative of the pristine tradition of Bali. There are similar examples of invented tradition all over the region, including the traditional festivals which have sprung up in urban communities in Japan which themselves were established only comparatively recently (e.g. Bestor 1989). The invention of tradition tends to go hand in hand with increasing affluence: one of the points which Yamashita makes in relation to Bali is that the Balinese spend their new found wealth derived from the tourist industry on upgrading temples and religious ritual – which then become even greater tourist attractions.

There are nevertheless some disturbing aspects of tourism. The ecological impact of the construction of resorts has already been mentioned. Even more disturbing is the growth of sex tourism in countries such as Thailand and the consequent spread of HIV infection (Bishop and Robinson 2000, Van Esterik 2000: 163-98, Manderson and Jolly 1997). Disease is also becoming globalized, as well as consumption.

The Media and Information Technology

The internationalization of consumption is linked in turn to the internationalization of the media. The information technology revolution has led to the emergence of giant global media companies, such as News International, Time Warner, or Disney, the source of Japan’s largest tourist attraction (Raz 1999). With the development of the Internet, the logical step was to merge the content companies with the computer service providers, as has happened with the takeover of Time Warner by AOL. As Castells argues, the dawn of the information age has serious implications for the conducting of politics (1997: 309-53). It is nearly impossible for governments to stop the flow of information over their borders, even though China and Singapore have
tried valiantly (Ono and Aoki 2000). The conventional view is that the new information technology provides the basis for economic growth, however inconvenient it is for authoritarian governments. Satellite television and the press are easier to control, though they are also becoming increasingly available on the Internet. In addition, politicians become dependent on the media for their publicity, which means that they have to fit in with media priorities and scheduling. Coverage of long speeches are replaced by repeated replays of video clips and sound bites, and political news is graded for its commercial potential rather than its intellectual content. As a result, politics becomes at best television drama and at worst television soap opera.

The Environment

Looming over everything in the region are the problems of the environment, a matter of common concern on both sides of the Pacific. Analysis of environmental problems operates at several different levels: from that of global diplomacy, represented by the Kyoto agreement and its unilateral revocation by the U.S.; to the regional level, represented by the smoke from the Indonesian fires which blanketed much of Southeast Asia in the late 1990s or the pollution spreading from China into neighboring countries; or to the national level, represented by local concerns over air pollution, water pollution, the effects of industrialization and urbanization, and deforestation. Each of these areas has spawned its own large literature. In the longer term, global warming will of course be disastrous for many of the smaller states of the Pacific Basin, particularly islands which may start to disappear under the water as the level rises.

There are two general issues which may be briefly taken up here however. The first is the basic contradiction in development, which is that in general people want a higher standard of living and are prepared to put up with a degree of environmental degradation as long as they are becoming demonstrably wealthier. This was the case in Japan in the early 1970s, as reported by Smith (1978), though there policy changed rapidly in the wake of major court actions by the victims of Minamata disease and other diseases caused by industrial pollution (McKean 1981). But governments in the region have a constant problem of legitimacy (Alagappa 1995), and one strategy which all of them attempt is to raise or maintain the standard of living of their peoples. America under Bush seems to be no exception, and a fuel shortage in California is currently a more pressing issue for American politicians than the dangers of future global warming.

The second point is that it is only when people are relatively affluent that the environmental begins to become a major priority — or when pollution crosses inconveniently over international boundaries, as in the case of smoke from Indonesian forests. Linked to this is a third point, that environmental activism can only take off with the development of civil society — NGO’s and citizens’ groups which can monitor the activities of government and capital and try to change them, either through the ballot box or social movements. Elsewhere I have discussed the stages in

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this process in the context of East and Southeast Asia (Eades 1999). Currently Japan would seem to be furthest along the road in the development of environmental consciousness and an environmental movement. Taiwan and Korea are catching up, following the process of democratization and the emergence of a powerful middle class voice. In Thailand and Malaysia, the beginnings of an environmental movement are there, often expressed through the local mobilization of ethnic or religious groups.\(^{26}\) Finally, in China, continued government control of much of heavy industry means that the polluter is also the watchdog, and given the Chinese government’s priorities in terms of increasing the standard of living and controlling the rise of unemployment, environmental concerns often have to take second place.\(^{27}\) Smil (1993) however argues that the issue is one which will slow down China’s economic growth sooner rather than later and that the root of the problem is one of continued population growth, which may only be curtailed through rising affluence.\(^{28}\) In Japan the birthrate has slumped (Jolivet 1997) without any government urging, as marriage ages rise, as the competition continues for places in the most prestigious schools and universities which will ensure the best jobs, and as an increasing number of people are rejecting conventional nuclear family lifestyles altogether.

Globalization

One of the most spectacular developments in politics in the major industrial countries in the last decade has been the occurrence of major protests and demonstrations against globalization and capitalism, which now seem to erupt at almost every major meeting of international leaders, to say nothing of the May Day marches, protests, and violence between police and demonstrators which have become a fixed part of the calendar throughout much of Europe. “Globalization” itself is a term which only became current in the 1990s: a quick perusal of the Oxford University library holdings once more reveals that the number of books with “globalization” in the title rose from just 4 in 1991 to 40 in 1994, and 133 in 1999. It is a result of a large number of separate processes: the growing size and power of international corporations, the “shrinking” of the world because of falling costs of transport and telecommunications, and the increased standardization of consumption as the same products are marketed worldwide, but the main factor linking all of these together, of course, is information technology. The results, as Castells, Sassen and others have argued (Sassen 1991, Castells 1999: chapter 2), has been a widening rift between the rich and the poor, particularly those excluded from information technology. Underlying this exclusion is the fact that since the mass introduction of the home computer in the mid-1980s, machines have not become much cheaper and trickled down to the poor. Rather they have become increasingly powerful, while the price of low-end models has stayed roughly the same. Given the structure of the industry and the falling cost of memory, this pattern is likely to continue, at least until the cost of memory stops falling because the limits of miniaturization in the computer chip

\(^{26}\) See for instance the papers in Gosling (2001).
\(^{27}\) On the restructuring of industry in China, see Steinfeld (1998).
industry have been reached, or until somebody decides to tap the latent market in the
developing countries for much simpler and cheaper machines. Also, given that the
large corporations and information technology are *faits accomplis* – it is difficult to
see what street protests or increasingly impotent national governments can do about it.
And as a final ironic note, is the usually same information technology which has
allowed these protest groups to organize themselves in the first place. There may also
be legal limits to the growth of the large companies however. The use of anti-trust
and anti-monopoly laws may be one way in which governments can take limited
action, if only by preventing the international companies getting any bigger through
further mergers and takeovers.

*Human Rights*

Globalization is therefore increasingly linked to human rights, another concern which
both links and divides the two sides of the Pacific. 29 Some of the worst human rights
violations in recent decades have occurred in Southeast Asia, notably Cambodia and
East Timor. 30 Most of the current debate concerns China, with much of the most
violent rhetoric coming from the United States. This debate is an interesting one
because it points to the complexity of human rights issues, the number of levels of
analysis and specific issues involved, and, to an extent, the historically questionable
double standards of the main participants. Certainly there are human rights issues in
China: the draconian population policy, particularly in its impact upon women; the
denial of autonomy and the repression of dissent in Tibet; the repression of religious
groups such as Falun Gong, and the repression of the student movement in
Tiananmen Square in 1989. 31 And yet the China of today is clearly a better place to
live in than the China of the Cultural Revolution period for the majority of the
population, even if the benefits have not always trickled down to the more remote
rural areas or the workers made unemployed by industrial restructuring. Even in
relation to politics and administrative control, Perry and Selden (2000) argue that
there have been sweeping changes in the last decade: in legal rationalization, the
relaxation of control over the arts and intellectuals, and the introduction of elections
in local government. In part this is the result of changing state policy, but in part it is
also the result of grass-roots pressure made apparent in a number of ways. 32

The issue of human rights is philosophically complex – the meaning of
“freedom” itself differs markedly throughout the region, and state priorities in the
kinds of “freedom” they grant to their citizens are clearly also different (Kelly and

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29 For general discussions see the papers in Kelly and Reid (eds) 1998, Bauer and Bell (eds) 1999.
30 Recent studies include Hainsworth and McCloskey (2000), Pinto and Jardine (1997) and Taylor
Cambodia. For a critical survey of political instability in the region against the background of
international capitalism, see Gunn (2000).
31 There is a considerable literature on Tiananmen, including Salisbury (1989), Han (ed.) (1990), both
of which appeared quickly after the event, and the more recent Nathan and Link (eds) (2001). On the
state of China in the aftermath, see also Miles (1997).
32 Recent studies of Chinese politics include Lieberthal (1995), Christiansen and Rai (1997), Zheng
(2000), and the papers in Part II of Dittmer et al. (eds) (2000). On culture, arts and the media, see also
Reid 1998). There is also what Sen calls the “Lee thesis”, that “political and civil rights hamper economic growth” (Sen 1999: 91) – though Sen himself believes that the evidence for a relationship between authoritarian government and economic growth is hardly conclusive. As for the debate over “Asian values,” Ghai (1999: 263-64) argues that they are likely to be a casualty of the Asian economic crisis. “In the 1980s and 1990s ‘Asian values’ seemed to fit in with the imperatives of globalization, with their emphasis on minimal state welfare, limited trade union rights, reliance on family, and restricted political participation. In a similar fashion the present crisis has shown their negative aspects, dynastic politics, nepotism, cronyism, the lack of transparency and accountability, the absence of or failure to enforce regulations – and the general disregard of the rights of people … The ability of governments to fashion national ideologies has suffered a major setback and will continue to atrophy in the face of new information technologies, which promote more openness and encouraging pluralism.”33

Organized Crime

A further issue discussed in detail by Castells (1999: chapter 3) is the global network of organized crime. He argues that the economics and politics of a number of countries in the region (including Russia, Burma, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) cannot be understood without considering the dynamics of the pervasive criminal networks (1999: 167). There is a growing literature on this in Asia as well as in North America, and both sides of the Pacific are linked by the narcotics trade and the resulting movements of capital and money laundering. But these are not the only activities to worry about: Castells also lists the trades in weapons, nuclear materials, illegal immigrants, women and children, and even body parts (1999: 174-79). A number of studies of organized crime have appeared in recent years; in addition to the Mafia in the United States, they include most recently the yakuza in Japan (Seymour 1996, Herbert 2000), the Triads in China (Booth 1999), the drugs industry of the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia (Renard 1996), and the Russian “Mafiya” (Castells 1999: 180-90, citing Sterling 1994). Some of the international connections become apparent in the various accounts of Aum Shinrikyo and its attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 (Brackett 1996, Kaplan and Marshall 1996). Criminal networks are often intimately linked with local politicians and less scrupulous businessmen as well, for instance in Sidel’s recent study of the Philippines (1999). There are also the inevitable links with the sex industry on both sides of the Pacific.

Herbert (2000) has argued for Japan that the authorities in Japan actually have no real wish to stamp out organized crime and replace it with disorganized crime which is more difficult to control. In addition, the Japanese yakuza themselves are remarkably adept in dealing with any new legislation which the Japanese authorities care to throw at them. He argues that as long as they can provide goods and services which are desirable but unobtainable on the legal market, they are likely to remain a force in Japanese society. This argument also applies elsewhere. Even though

33 Chua (1995) presents a similar argument in relation to Singapore. For the issues surrounding the notion of Asian values, see Caquelin, Lim and Mayer-Koenig (eds) (1998), and Sheridan (1999).
researchers working with drug addicts and dealers have argued that the best way to
destroy the trade is to reduce the profits by decriminalizing narcotics in the United
States (e.g. Bourgois 1995: 321), this solution is as yet politically unacceptable to
American politicians, and so the war against drugs and the gangs continues, with
draconian punishments being imposed throughout much of Southeast Asia, raising
further issues of human rights.

International Relations

Finally, perhaps the most important issue in the Asia Pacific region at the moment is
that of international relations.\textsuperscript{34} Again, there are many levels: that of global strategic
relations, particularly the relations between the U.S., China and Russia; the growth of
regional organizations such as APEC, ASEAN and NAFTA, and local level relations
between neighboring countries, as in the Korean peninsula or the various disputes
over ownership of uninhabited islands (both of which of course have wider
international ramifications). International relations, particularly between Japan, the
U.S. and China, provided the focus for Dr Funabashi’s keynote address during the
symposium, and he painted a gloomy picture, with the moves towards regional unity
stalled and with weak leadership in each of the three major countries involved. Things
have not improved in the few months since. China remains preoccupied with Taiwan
and the leadership is scheduled to change, with the inevitable jockeying for power
between conservatives and liberals. Meanwhile the economic integration between the
two states based on the flows of capital from Taiwan to the mainland apparently

Japan has just acquired a seemingly more popular and dynamic prime
minister, though elections are scheduled for the middle of the year. In the case of the
United States, the new administration is pursuing its conservative agenda with
considerable energy despite its ongoing loss of control over Congress. Relations with
China over Taiwan, and with the other industrial countries over the environment, have
chilled considerably since Bush took over. It may be that in the long run, as Close and
Ohki-Close in their discussions of “supranationalism” argue (Close and Ohki-Close
1999, Close 2000), the move towards more powerful global and regional
organizations regulatory bodies is irresistible. But in the short term the barriers to
progress noted by Funabashi will continue to exist.

Conclusion

The mission of APU, as described by Professor Sakamoto, is premised on the need for
trained manpower to meet the challenges posed by the emerging order of the Asia
Pacific region, and the first symposium was concerned with the technicalities of the
educational programs by which this might be achieved. A number of themes kept
reappearing in this, and it perhaps worth listing them briefly by way of a conclusion.

\textsuperscript{34} Recent studies include Acharya (2001), Akaha (1999), Huxley and Willett (1999), Cha (1999), and
Alagappa (ed.) 1998). On China’s relations with America, see Foot (1995) and Mann (2000), and with
its maritime neighbours, see Austin (1998). On Singapore, see Leifer (2000). On Asia’s relations with
Europe see Dent (1999), and Fukasaku et al. (1998). On APEC, see Yamazawa (2000).
(a) *The dynamics of knowledge creation.* This came out most clearly in Professor Nonaka’s paper on the differences between the status and use of knowledge in East and West. He and other speakers stressed the importance of “knowledge workers,” and this relates to the wider literature on the role of knowledge in Japanese and other enterprises, notably Fruin (1997) in his study of Toshiba. Whatever the role of values in knowledge creation, the more stable labor force of core employees which Japanese companies have employed on a lifetime basis (at least, till recently) may also explain the importance of tacit knowledge in their day to day operations. In addition, knowledge creation is clearly related to the level of education and motivation among the work force. Whether this is the result of “traditional” values such as Confucianism, or historical developments, as many western scholars would now argue, is a moot point.

(b) *Company organization.* The flow of information and knowledge is connected with wider differences in company organization, not only between East and West, but within Asia itself. Despite their relative success (at least, until the crisis of 1997), there have clearly also been significant differences between the organization of companies in, for instance, Japan, Korea, and China, and these are starting to be systematically explored. However, there is also a degree of convergence, as the most useful practices diffuse between companies in different regions and become global practice. Other factors such as the distribution of shares and control, e.g. whether or not they remain in family hands, are also important in understanding company dynamics and the processes of change and reform.

(c) *Management education.* A number of speakers noted the importance of “hands-on” experience, and dissolving the boundary between work and education. It was suggested that the in-house training system traditional in Japanese companies is no longer serving the purpose, and that more systematic professional qualifications are required. This will require partnerships between the universities and industry, and several of these initiatives in a number of countries were discussed in the symposium. In relation to this, the importance of training in ethics was also stressed, as well as skills in dealing with people from diverse cultural backgrounds. This suggests the increasing need for international learning environments, in which regional organizations such as ASEAN as well as international universities like APU should be able to play a role.

(d) *The organization of management schools.* Generally it was assumed by the participants that future management education would be delivered not by individual schools but by networks of institutions, often in partnership with industry, as already noted. This will require the development of distance learning facilities, and the resolutions of issues of intellectual property in relation to online courses. Generally the trend will be towards “transnational” universities and this will require the development of international teaching
materials, drawing on the experience of a wide range of countries within the region.

In contrast to the general consensus about the future of management education in the region, ideas about the present state of Asia Pacific studies and its future appear less well defined. Clearly it is a very diverse region, and indeed it is one which used to be studied as a series of smaller regions by both discipline-based and areas studies specialists: Siberia, China, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, Oceania, Australasia, North America, Latin America, and the Arctic. The sheer size of the region and the volume of publications makes it almost impossible for anyone to be familiar with the current specialist literature on any one of these regions, let alone all of them. Any discussion of the region as a whole requires a focus on a limited set of issues. Some of these have been outlined above, and many of them are clearly related to each other. Certainly it is very difficult to consider the problems of the environment in a vacuum, without taking into consideration the standard of living of the peoples in each region, the pattern of industrialization and the ownership and control of industry, labor relations, the political processes relating to the environment, and the international context of agreements and different national agendas in relation to these problems. Similarly, the technologies and the knowledge for sustainable development, or at least alleviating the environmental problems of the region, are probably already with us: the problem is rather making those solutions economically desirable to international capital, and politically desirable to the regimes most responsible for the damage to the environment.

A final point to be made is that the economic dynamism of the region. The fluidity of the pattern of international relations, and the speed with which cultures and information are moving and mixing throughout it, mean that it is very difficult to speculate about the future development of “Asia Pacific studies” or even how the region will develop over the next few years. Only a dozen years ago in Europe, the conventional boundaries of “European studies” or “Common Market studies” as then practiced stopped at the boundary between East and West Germany. That boundary soon disappeared, and the EU is set to expand into large parts of Eastern Europe. What we study is inevitably shaped by forces which are more powerful than our intellectual agendas: the future of the relations between the U.S. and other emerging economic and political superpowers, crisis and growth within the world economy; internal instability within individual countries with knock-on effects elsewhere; future developments in technology; and probably an increasing shortage of mineral oil reserves. For the future of Asia Pacific studies as a discipline, as well as APU as an institution, it is certainly possible to define an agenda of current issues, as has been attempted in this paper. However, casting them in concrete is probably not a good idea at this stage, given the increasing uncertainties and the “new disorder” of the post-Cold War world in which we live. Institutions, agendas and curricula all tend to change and adapt over time as knowledge is acquired and as the subject matter itself is transformed in new and unexpected ways.
References


